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Excessive Discovery in Federal and Illinois Courts:
A Tool of Harassment and Delay?
INTRODUCTION

Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that
the Rules be construed to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."' The Illinois Civil Practice Act expresses a similar purpose.2 Recent criticism suggests that current
discovery practices in the federal and Illinois courts do not comply
with these policies of fairness, promptness, and economy,' and that
the discovery
rules "have too often proved tools of harassment and
4
delay."
This article will focus on excessive discovery as an abusive pretrial practice. Although criticism of abusive and excessive procedures abounds, a definition of such abuse is not easy to find.0 Further, any definition of excessive discovery will be necessarily vague,
because excessiveness depends on the facts of each case.'
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
2. The Act provides that it "shall be liberally construed, to the end that controversies
may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 4 (1979). The Act also confers upon the Illinois Supreme Court the
authority to promulgate rules for the "orderly and expeditious administration and enforcement" of the Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2-3 (1979).
3. See Blair, Attacking the Caseload Dilemma: An Open Letter to the Bench and Bar of
Iowa, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 319, 321 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Blair]; ELLINGTON, A STUDY
OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE (1979) [hereinafter cited as ELLINGTON]; Lundquist &
Schechter, The New Relevancy: An End to Trial by Ordeal, 64 A.B.A.J. 59, 61 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lundquist).
4. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 204 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. "The line between proper, even properly agressive, use of discovery and its abuse is
difficult to draw. 'Perhaps [abuse of discovery] is like pornography-it is very easy to recognize, but it is awfully hard to define.'" Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules
and Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253, 271
(1979) (quoting from the transcript of the Metropolitan Chief Judges Conference, April 19,
1976; comment by an unidentified judge).
6. It is possible for a single discovery request to be abusive, as it is possible for
sixty-two requests to be appropriate, relevant, and facilitative in the disposition of
a particular case. . . . [A]buse-to the extent it exists-must be found in the
quality of the discovery requests, not in the quantity. . . . [emphasis supplied].
P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN, & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CONNOLLY]. See also Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1150 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Speck] ("If 100 to 150 pages of depositions are reasonable in a tort case worth $20,000,'then
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This article will identify the potential for abuse through the use
of excessive discovery. Some major of causes of excessiveness will
be identified and the present methods of counteracting these
causes will be outlined. Finally, proposals for change in discovery
procedure will be presented and evaluated in light of the problem
of excessive discovery.
RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCOVERY ABUSE

Increasing numbers of legal commentators have noted that the
modern discovery process is being abused. 7 In a recent decision,

100,000 to 150,000 pages would not be out of proportion in a case worth $20,000,000.").
7. "[O]ur pretrial procedures have acquired the reputation, largely justified, of being
hopelessly arcane, unnecessarily complex and prohibitively expensive." Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pollack]. See
generally Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of
Modern Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Becker]; Blair, supra note 3; Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Burger]; Ellington, supra note 3; Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Kirkham].
Although many commentators contend that discovery abuses exist, some knowledgeable
legal observers maintain that discovery properly fulfills its original purposes.
[D]iscovery does appear to have fulfilled expectations in making information and
evidence readily available to all parties. It is popular and employed extensively.
The use of discovery devices has given effect to substantive rights in both tort and
business litigations. Without liberal discovery thousands of parties would each
year be unable to substantiate their legal rights.
Speck, supra note 6, at 1155. "[Djiscovery abuse, to the extent it exists, does not permeate
the vast majority of federal filings." CONNOLLY, supra note 6, at 35. See also GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 117-23, 129-34 (1968); WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS 369 (1976). Further, there is some evidence that discovery, under its present scope,
is very popular with attorneys, only a small percentage of whom find discovery harmful. See
generally 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02[3] (2d ed. 1979). The Attorney General of
the United States recently estimated that only about ten percent of federal cases tend to
generate discovery problems. Q. and A. with the New Attorney General, 65 A.B.A.J. 1497,
1500 (1979). In fact, surveys have shown that in federal civil practice, most cases have no
discovery activity at all. See ELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 3. However, this evidence may also
support the proposition that discovery abuse is a problem. If only a small percentage of
cases involve discovery, it may follow that, compared with that small percentage, the instances of abuse become more significant. Furthermore, it is not clear in the Ellington study
how many of those cases which did not involve discovery were cases which were settled or
dismissed early in the pretrial stage. Because all litigants have access to discovery, the potential for misuse may be more significant that the current estimates of actual misuse.
Moreover, the scarcity of reported decisions of discovery abuse is not indicative of the
extent of the problem; rulings on discovery are not final orders and hence are not appealable. See American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277 (2d
Cir. 1967); Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Center Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358 (10th
Cir. 1964); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 360 (1976). In Illinois, an adjudication of contempt is a
final and appealable order and is an appropriate method for testing pretrial discovery or-
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four justices of the United States Supreme Court expressed concern for the prevalence of abusive discovery tactics.8
Federal trial judges rank excessive discovery as one of the most
serious discovery abuses.9 Excessive discovery includes the frequent use of long, time-wasting depositions and the multiplication
of expenses by large numbers of distant depositions.10 In one case
the depositions of 173 persons totalled more than 100,000 pages
and resulted in stenographer costs of approximately $500,000.11

ders. People ex rel General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967); Monier
v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966); Stimpert v. Abdnour, 24 Ill. 2d 26, 179
N.E.2d 602 (1962); Hill v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 292 Ill. 490, 127 N.E. 124 (1920); Kemeny
v. Skorch, 22 Ill. App. 2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959); Hawley Products Co. v. May, 314 Ill.
App. 537, 41 N.E.2d 769 (1942). In General Motors Corp. v. Bua, the Illinois Supreme Court
granted a rare discretionary hearing for an extraordinary writ of mandamus on a discovery
matter. The court hoped that its decision would "encouragle] the bench and bar to wisely
use the tools of discovery to illuminate the actual issues in the case rather than to harass
and obstruct the opposing litigant ..
" 37 Ill. 2d at 193, 226 N.E.2d at 14.
8. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Court held that a newspaper reporter's
thought processes were subject to discovery in a libel case. Writing for the majority, Justice
White noted that, "mushrooming litigation costs, much of it due to pretrial discovery, are
not peculiar to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated expressions of concern
about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this Court have joined in the chorus." Id. at 176. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that "discovery techniques
and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art-one not infrequently exploited to
the disadvantage of justice." Id. at 179. Justice Stewart in a dissenting opinion, commented,
"In a system of federal procedure whose prime goal is 'the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action,' time-consuming and expensive pretrial discovery is burdensome enough, even when within the arguable bounds of Rule 26(b)." Id. at 202.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall charged that litigants had capitalized on the Court's broad
mandate in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S.
104 (1964), and "on occasion transformed Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 devices into tactics of
attrition." Id. at 204 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 n.4 (1980): "The
glacial path of much litigation breeds frustration with the federal courts and, ultimately,
disrespect for the law."
9. ELLINGTON, supra note 3. "[Mjany participants in the civil litigation system regard
excessive discovery as a justice-threatening abuse and one that a system of sanctions is not
able to cope with well." Id. at 93. Excessive discovery is not the only important type of
discovery abuse. Delay in responding to and noncompliance with requests for discovery are
significant abuses which demand attention. For a detailed treatment of delay and noncompliance in the context of discovery sanctions, see Note, Recent Trends in the Imposition of
Sanctions in Federal and Illinois Courts, 11 Loy. CH. L.J. 773 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Sanctions].
10. Speck, supra note 6, at 1152.
11. Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 92 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Ferguson was an antitrust and patent infringement case where $342,000,000 in damages were sought, 45,000 documents were marked as exhibits, and more than 700,000 pages of documents were produced
for inspection.
With regard to stenographic costs, FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) provides for depositions to be
taken by other than stenographic means. The rule is designed to decrease the parties' costs
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Requests to produce may also prove unduly oppressive; in one
instance, 2,000 man-hours were needed to produce 57,000 records
in order to answer a single request.12 A plaintiff's subpoena duces
tecum was held to be overly burdensome where the defendant had
previously submitted some 80,000 documents, 44,000 of which were
microfilmed, and the plaintiff only wanted the subpoenaed materials in order to facilitate marking exhibits for trial. 13
The practice of requesting and administering medical examinations14 is also subject to abuse. In one case, where nine physical
and mental examinations were requested, the Supreme Court determined that only one examination could be justified."
The largest source of abuse and complaint, however, is the use of
interrogatories. 16 Interrogatories may become a tool of abuse when
they are comprised of an inordinate number of questions seeking
excessive amounts of information. For example, in one case involving multi-district litigation, the court struck a "behemoth" set of
interrogatories, which measured two inches high and 381 pages
long, contained 2,736 questions including subparts, and would have
conservatively cost $24,000 to answer. 17 Other courts have viewed
whenever that may be accomplished 'without loss of accuracy and integrity. Colonial Times,
Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Lucas v. Curran, 62 F.R.D. 336
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk, 60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Buck v. Board of
Education, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
12. Alexander v. Parsons, 75 F.R.D. 536 (W.D. Mich. 1977). See also People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967), where a request to the defendant to produce all records regarding a certain make of automobile for a five year period was
considered too broad. The records sought for each year were voluminous, and their production would have entailed substantial expense, labor, and disruption of business. Cf. Borg v.
Borg, 32 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 337 N.E.2d 391 (1975) (production request held to be a "fishing
expedition").
13. Jack Loeks Enterprises, Inc. v. W.S. Butterfield Theatres, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 303 (E.D.
Mich. 1957).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 35; ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 215 (1979).
15. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1964). For a further discussion of
court-ordered medical examinations, see Note, Court-Ordered Physical and Mental Examinations: A Survey of Federal Rule 35 and Illinois Rule 215, 11 Loy. CH. L.J. 725 (1980).
16. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 7, at 224, where the author states that interrogatories
are used as a device to shirk preparation of the case, that their use at trial is insubstantial
and as such, that "[ijnterrogatories have become a prime offender in abusive, burdensome,
unjustified, limitless, wasteful discovery."
17. In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 74 F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1975). The court
noted that the effects of excessive discovery increase geometrically in complex litigation:
If now every defendant proceeds to indiscriminately interrogate cross-claiming defendants the barrage of useless paperwork will be insurmountable. There are in
excess of 300 cross-claims in this litigation. If 300 interrogatories of 381 pages are
sent to each of the sixty-seven parties on the service list, the Xerox machines will
have to grind out 7,535,800 pieces of paper which will occupy 3,768 linear feet of
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excessively long interrogatories as an undue burden and abuse of
the discovery process, and have refused to compel response. 8
The use of form interrogatories, which often ask for a great deal
of information irrelevant to the pending action, is another objectionable tactic.19 In one personal injury case, the plaintiff's 200 interrogatories were copied from a form book. The information requested ranged from the color of the defendant's eyes to whether it
20
was snowing on the date of the accident, which occurred in July.

The court struck the interrogatories as frivolous and oppressive in
number.21
"Undue and uncontrolled discovery" 2' can result in a variety of
undesirable effects. Excessive discovery can coerce the adverse
party into an unjust settlement."8 The discovery process becomes a
storage space. Answering will of course involve a proportionately greater volume of
paperwork.

Id. at 498.
18. See Krantz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Va. 1972) (1,500 interrogatories);
Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484 (D. Md. 1969) (200 interrogatories); Breeland v. Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 26 F.R.D. 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (200 interrogatories and sub-parts). But see
Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (103 interrogatories requiring 10-15,000 man-hours to answer; answer required).
19. See Kennelly, PretrialDiscovery-The Courts and Trial Lawyers Are Finally Discovering That Too Much of It Can Be Counterproductive, 21 TRIAL LAwYER's GUIDE 458,
471 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kennelly]. The author objects to the use of form interrogatories for six reasons:
(1) They tend to be used as instruments of harassment....
(2) For many, if not most, of the subjects covered by form interrogatories, a carefully framed answer, prepared by plaintiff's counsel, is a poor substitute for a
spontaneous answer in a deposition of the plaintiff, himself.
(3) Interrogatories are inflexible. Since the answers cannot be anticipated with
certainty, it is impossible to shape each succeeding interrogatory to fit the answer
to the preceding one....
(4) Interrogatories are time-consuming....
(5) The more searching and exhaustive the form interrogatories, the more they
serve to educate plaintiff's counsel, whose labors in finding and framing answers
will better prepare him to prosecute his and to anticipate and forestall defenses.
(6) Like a suit cut to fit all sizes, form interrogatories, designed for general use in
all types of cases, are ill-adapted for use in any one of them.
20. Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484 (D. Md. 1969). The court stated: "Although this
Court is committed to the liberal use of interrogatories for legitimate purposes, the Court
expects counsel to use some judgment in preparing interrogatories." Id. at 485.
21. Id.
22. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979).
23. See Speck, supra note 6, at 1152. See also Ellington, supra note 3, at 92. The "layman's" view is expressed in Editorial, PretrialPunishment, Bus. WEEK, December 12, 1977

[hereinafter cited as Editorial], at 162:
Ironically, the discovery procedure was adopted some 40 years ago to make lawsuits simpler and less chancy by eliminating the "surprise" witness or document.
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battle of attrition, with pretrial discovery "used as a weapon
against a financially weak litigant. ' 24 Tactics of excessiveness and
manipulation of discovery procedures often result in delays in the
judicial process, 5 contributing to the courts' backlog, and frequently meaning that the case must be tried twice. 26 Such tactics
inflate the cost of litigation27 and may constitute an invasion of
privacy. 28 Excessive discovery also permits "shotgun actions,"
where a litigant files suit and then employs discovery to ascertain
whether a cause of action exists."
The problems of a system that allows parties to control the litigation process through harassment and the imposition of inordinate expenses upon an adverse party cannot be ignored. Such control results in a manipulation of justice and denies access to the
courts to those without funds."0 The potential for abuse, especially
excessive abuse, should be a matter of substantial concern. 3 ' For-

The trouble is that the procedure is open-ended. Lawyers can search through the
files of their adversaries and take testimony of potential witnesses virtually without limit. They can plow through file drawers full of documents that would be
inadmissible at trial, collecting all sorts of irrelevant information as they go. Defense lawyers can use discovery to stall a case almost indefinitely. And Plaintiffs
can use it to run up the costs of a groundless case until the defendant caves in and
settles out of court.
24. How to Break Logjam in Courts, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 19, 1977, at 24
(interview with C.J. Burger) [hereinafter cited as Logjam]. Others have made similar observations. See, e.g., Speck, supra note 6, at 1152: "One attorney stated that the possibility of
prolonged discovery before trial made him hesitate to accept retainers from persons with
limited means because, although he could reasonably estimate the time required for other
aspects of the case, he could not forecast the time required for discovery."
25. See A.C.F. Indus., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 439 U.S. 1081, 1086 (1979) (denial of a petition of
writ of certiorari; dissenting opinion of Powell, J.); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 202
(1979) (dissenting opinion of Stewart, JJ.
26. See Burger, supra note 7, at 95-96.
27. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979).
28. See Kirkham, supra note 7, at 203.
29. Logjam, supra note 24, at 24. Kirkham, supra note 7, at 210 agrees that "[tihe cart
is before the horse":
A plaintiff who invokes the processes of a court knows, or should know, how and
by what he has been injured. In the complex case, as in every other, he must be
required to state this and to formulate triable issues before general discovery is
instituted. Discovery was instituted to uncover facts relevant to a cause of action.
It was never intended to be perverted into an instrument for fumbling about in an
effort to discover a cause of action.
Id. at 204.
30. See generally Burger, supra note 7; Kirkham, supra note 7; Pollack, supra note 7.
31. "[A]buse-to the extent it exists-must be found in the quality of the discovery
requests, not in the quantity, since fewer than 5 percent of the filings involved more than
ten requests." CONNOLLY, supra note 6, at 35. Furthermore, one study revealed that while
many of the federal judges interviewed ranked excessive discovery as the least frequent form
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mulation of procedures to prevent such abuse requires an examina-

tion of some of the causes of excessive discovery.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ExCEssIvE DISCOVERY

The broad scope of modern discovery is one cited cause of the
problem of excessive discovery. 2 The discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the disclosure of "any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. . ."" The scope of discovery thus
includes not only evidence admissible at trial, but information that

of abuse, most found this form to be the most serious. ELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 32-37.
32. See generally CONNOLLY, supra note 6; SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DisCOVERY ABUSE, SECTION OF LITIGATION, A.B.A. COMMENTS ON THE REVISED PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1979); Cohn, supra note 5; Pollack,
supra note 7.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure significantly changed
the nature of pretrial procedure.
In the days before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, trial by ambush and secrecy was considered normal in the courts of law. No discovery tools were available to ferret out information about an opponent's claim or defense. The purpose of
the pleadings was to identify and define factual issues. One misstep therein could
prove fatal to a claim or defense. The word was a talisman.
Pollack, supra note 7, at 220. Indeed, prior to the federal rules, fact pleading, and not discovery, narrowed the issues and determined the facts necessary to prepare for trial.
Through a complex and often lengthy exchange of pleadings, the parties were required to narrow the dispute to a single issue. If the issue was one of fact, it was
then tried before a jury. Although the virtual absence of discovery devices rendered pretrial preparation difficult, the common law procedure functioned satisfactorily as long as the pleadings accurately described the factual dispute and the
issues were so simple that extensive and complex proof was not demanded.
Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 H~av. L. REV. 940, 946 (1961). Discovery
was then permitted only under special circumstances and limited in scopre to material facts.
Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 22, 23
(1968). See Vennum v. Davis, 35 Ill. 568, 577 (1864); Shaw v. Weisz, 339 Ill. App. 630, 91
N.E.2d 81 (1950).
The federal rules drastically changed the philosophy of pleading in general and discovery
in particular.
Victory is intended to go to the party entitled to it, on all the facts, rather than to
the side that best uses its wits. It was thought that surprise, dearly cherished by
an earlier generation of trial lawyers, would be minimized or ended altogether.
The discovery rules complement the rules on pleadings. The pleadings are now
not much emphasized, since the discovery rules provide better means for performing the functions formerly demanded of the pleading.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 354 (1976). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
The federal scope of discovery shifted from a standard of materiality to one of relevance.
See Pollack, supra note 7, at 220. "Significantly, the function of pre-trial 'issue focusing,'
formerly the role of the pleadings, was remodeled around discovery relevant to the 'subject
matter.'" Id. at 221.
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will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.3U This broad
mandate has allowed courts to justify the production of half a million documents" and the submission of 1,500 interrogatories.3 The
federal policy has prompted criticism that the materials subject to
discovery can be nearly limitless. 7
Id. See generally Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978); Hickman
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.56[1] n.34 (2d ed. 1979).
Professor Wright argues for the broadest scope available:
Indeed it is not too strong to say that discovery should be considered relevant
where there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the
subject matter of the action. If protection is needed, it can better be provided by
the discretionary powers of the court to issue protective orders rather than a constricting concept of relevance.
34.

v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); 4 MooRE's

WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS

359 (1976) (footnote omitted).

35. See Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the Secretary of Agriculture moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum, which embraced one half million items
and would have allegedly demanded a time expenditure by the Department of Agriculture
equal to a one-man year and cost $10,000-15,000. The court held that the paramount interest of government in having justice done between parties in federal courts required a great
effort on the part of the Department to produce any document relevant to a fair determination of the litigation.
36. See Krantz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Va. 1972), where 1,500 questions
were posed in a tax fraud case. The court stated, "Generally the fact that interrogatories are
burdensome is alone not sufficient to excuse a party from answering them, nor will mere
numbers excuse a party." Id. at 557. Accord, Klausen v. Sidney Printing and Publishing Co.,
271 F. Supp. 783 (D. Kan. 1967); Rogers v. Tri-State Materials Corp., 51 F.R.D. 234 (N.D.
Ill. 1954). Query whether a judge can rationally determine that 1,500 questions are relevant
to the subject matter in a complicated lawsuit. For a negative response, see Kirkham, supra
note 7, at 203:
The Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation recently refused to consolidate a
case with the IBM-Control Data litigation, in part because of its belief that in
that case "hundreds of millions of documents will be produced." In another case,
1,265 depositions, totalling 144,000 transcript pages, waited the commencement of
trial. . . . Common sense requires the suggestion that the gathering and perusal
of one hundred million documents is beyond the scope of reasonable discovery.
Even more, it makes one question how masses of data of this magnitude can possibly be assimilated and welded into an informed decision.
37. See Editorial, supra note 23, at 162. See also Kirkham, supra note 7, at 202, wherein
the author states:
When notice pleading dumps into the lap of a court an enormous controversy
without the slightest guide to what the court is asked to decide; when discovery-totally unlimited because no issue is framed-mulls over millions of papers,
translates them to microfilm and feeds them into computers to find out if they can
be shuffled into any relevance;. . . we should, .... consider whether noble experiments have gone awry.
For requests to produce, the broad scope of discovery authorizes disclosure of documents
and other tangible items relevant to the subject matter of the action. Goldman v. Checker
Taxi Company, 325 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1963); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 76
F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441, 444
(N.D. Ill. 1977); United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 66 F.R.D. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Formost Promotions v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15 F.R.D. 128 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
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Illinois has similarly adopted an expansive concept of the permissible scope of discovery." Illinois Supreme Court Rule
201(b)(1) permits a party to obtain "full disclosure regarding any
[non-privileged] matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action. . . ."9 As in the federal courts, inadmissible
40
matters that may lead to admissible evidence are discoverable.
See also Heathman v. United States District Court for the Central District of California,
503 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1974); Sylgab Steel and Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 357 F.
Supp. 659 (N.D. 11. 1973); La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164 (D. Del.
1973). Courts may require the production of documents and things not in the possession of
the responding party. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill.
1977); 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PIAcTcE 34.17 (2d ed. 1979). The test for requiring production is whether the party has a legal right to control or obtain the things or documents. See
Buckley v. Vidal, 50 F.R.D. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Indeed, considering the wide scope of discoverable materials, it may be advisable to maintain business files in a manner suitable for
discovery. See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1977), where
the court ordered the FBI to produce documents which the FBI claimed would be burdensome and too difficult to produce, because the materials requested were not filed in any
organized filing system. The court stated, "To allow a defendant whose business generates
massive records to frustrate discovery by creating an inadequate filing system, and then
claiming undue burden, would defeat the purposes of discovery rules." Id. at 447. See also
Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (1976).
38. Coutrakon v. Distenfield, 21 111. App. 2d 146, 152, 157 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1959). In
Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 37, 41, 132 N.E.2d 532, 535 (1956), the Illinois
Supreme Court reviewed the legislative intent of the discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act:
By its enactment of section 58(2) the General Assembly showed its purpose to
broaden substantially the scope of available discovery. It acted in response to prevailing dissatisfaction with procedural doctrines which had exalted the role of a
trial as a battle of wits and subordinated its function as a means of ascertaining
the truth. The doctrines which thus unduly emphasized the adversary quality of
litigation originated in judicial decisions. . . . The hostile attitude toward discovery which sired those decisions was rejected by the General Assembly in the Civil
Practice Act. "Discovery before trial" presupposes a range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admissible at the trial, but also that which
leads to what is admissible at the trial.
See also Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 22,
26 (1968).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(b)(1) (1977). See City of Bloomington v. Quinn, 114
Ill. App. 2d 145, 147, 252 N.E.2d 10, 12 (1969), wherein the court stated: "There can be little
doubt that complete disclosure, via the authorized discovery methods prescribed in Rule
201, is now the 'order of the day' and standard procedure in Illinois." But see Bauter v.
Reding, 68 Il. App. 3d 171, 175, 385 N.E.2d 886, 890 (1979), in which the court declared,
"relevancy is determined by reference to the issues, for generally, something is relevant if it
tends to prove or disprove something in issue."
40. People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Il. 2d 231, 237, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957); Krupp v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 38, 41, 132 N.E.2d 532, 535 (1956) (" 'Discovery before
trial' presupposes a range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admissible at the trial, but also that which leads to what is admissible at the trial.") See
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966); Bauter v. Reding, 68 Ill. App.
3d 171, 385 N.E.2d 886 (1979); Elliot v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 31 Ill. App.
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Therefore, the problem of a wide scope of discovery leading to possible abuses is present in both Illinois and federal courts.
A major cause of abuse is the lack of judicial intervention in the
discovery process.4 As the scope of discoverable matter has increased over the years, the amount of judicial supervision of the
discovery process has diminished. 2 Modern discovery practice
grants virtually unlimited discretion over timing and enforcement
of discovery requests to attorneys. 3 Indeed, the 1970 amendments
to the federal discovery rules were intended to reduce the time
spent by judges on discovery matters.4" Furthermore, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) and the new Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires litigants to consult each other and
make reasonable attempts to resolve their differences before bringing any discovery motion before the court.' 5 Hence, the current

3d 355, 335 N.E.2d 33 (1975); Cohn v. Board of Educ. of Waukegan Twp. H.S. Dist. 119, 118
Ill. App. 2d 453, 254 N.E.2d 803 (1970); City of Bloomington v. Quinn, 114 Ill. App. 2d 145,
252 N.E.2d 10 (1969). See also Monier v. Chamberlain, 31 Ill. 2d 400, 202 N.E.2d 15 (1964);
Hruby v. Chicago Transit Authority, 11111. 2d 255, 142 N.E.2d 81 (1957).
41. See CONNOLLY, supra note 6, at 3-4; Pollack, supra note 7, at 221, wherein the author
states, "it has now become clear that to an important degree the courts and the paying
public cannot depend on counsel to effectively regulate and police discovery activity; it has
assumed a troublesome 'runaway' aspect."
42. One commentator has noted: "While judicial control over discovery has been diminishing, the magnitude of discovery conducted in some cases has been increasing in an alarm-

ing fashion."

ELLINGTON,

supra note 3, at 1-2. See

CONNOLLY,

supra note 6, at 9-10.

43. "Today's rules confer no express authority on judges either to control the initiation
of discovery or to require compliance with the time limits set by the rules. Under the present rules, judicial involvement in the discovery process is almost totally dependent on the
adversaries." CONNOLLY, supra note 6, at 10.
44. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendments, 28 U.S.C. app. 458 (1976),
pertaining to the revision of Rule 33(a) on the use of interrogatories; Cohn, supra note 5, at
254.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(k) (1979), provides:
Every motion with respect to discovery shall incorporate a statement that after
personal consultation and reasonable attempts to resolve differences the parties
have been unable to reach an accord. The court may order that reasonable costs,
including attorneys' fees, be assessed against a party or his attorney who unreasonably fails to facilitate discovery under this provision.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(5) (effective August 1, 1980), similarly provides:
A statement showing that the attorney making the motion has made a reasonable
effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the
motion. Each party and his attorney are under a duty to participate in good faith
in the framing of a discovery plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any
party. Notice of the motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions
to matters set forth in the motion shall be served not later than 10 days after
service of the motion.
Requiring the attorneys to attempt to resolve their differences before bringing discovery
problems before the court may have the salutory effect of conserving judicial resources. See
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trend in Illinois and federal courts is to curtail judicial involvement in discovery matters, thus relegating the responsibility for
monitoring discovery to the attorneys of the litigants.
The failure of attorneys to exercise restraint in the discovery
process is also a major cause of excessive discovery. The motivations for the lack of responsible discovery by attorneys may vary.
It has been suggested that tactics of excessive discovery may be the
product of a lawyer's obligation to his or her client. The rationale
is that it is in the defending litigant's interest to employ those tactics which will cause delay or extra expense to the adverse party,
and it is in the plaintiff's interest to make discovery so excessive
and costly that a "good" settlement will seem cheap by comparison.4 Another reason for unrestrained discovery tactics is the
"sporting theory of justice," as first described by Dean Roscoe
Pound in 1906. This theory makes trial practice a sport in which
7
litigants try to "beat" the game by misusing discovery tactics.
A less self-serving, yet significant, reason for excessive discovery
is the attorney's fear of under-preparation for trial or cross-examination.'8 Yet another reason is the tendency of some lawyers to file
a lawsuit and then use discovery to identify the claim.9 This pro-

note 110 infra and accompanying text.
46. Cohn, supra note 5, at 255-56 n.25.
47. The effect of our exaggerated contentious procedure is not only to irritate parties, witnesses and jurors in particular cases, but to give to the whole community a
false notion of the purpose and end of law. Hence comes, in large measure, the
modern American race to beat the law. If the law is a mere game, neither the
players who take part in it nor the public who witness it can be expected to yield
to its spirit when their interests are served by evading it. And this is doubly true
in a time which requires all institutions to be economically efficient and socially
useful.
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION [hereinafter cited as MANUAL], published as 1 Pt.2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1978) at vii-viii,
citing POUND, THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, reprinted in 46 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 55, 61 (1962).
48. ELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 92-93 (citing lawyers' fear of malpractice suits as one
reason for overburdening discovery). Judge Bua of the Northern District of Illinois has concluded that most trial attorneys are afraid that "unless there is complete pretrial disclosure
of all of the facts, data, treatises, books, research and materials upon which the expert bases
his opinion, cross-examination often will be meaningless." Bua, Experts-Some Comments
Relating to Discovery and Testimony Under New Federal Rules of Evidence, 21 TRIAL
LAWYER'S GUIDE 1, 21 (1977).
49. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. See also ELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 93.
Other reasons for the use of excessive discovery are the lack of economic incentive to deter
the discovering party and the reluctance of many judges to involve themselves in the factual
development of the case. Pollack, supra note 7, at 223. One observer found that a great
amount of abuse in civil antitrust litigation stems from confusing the roles of public attor-
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cedure is commonly known as "going on a fishing expedition."5'
Thus, recognition of various attorney motivations indicates that
excessive discovery may at times stem from a conscientious attorney's zeal, but more often results from self-serving strategies. Such
abusive tactics benefit the interests of litigants at the cost of the
efficient administration of justice.
CURRENT METHODS OF DEALING WITH ABUSE

There are several ways of ameliorating excessive discovery in Illinois and federal courts. The available methods include protective
orders, the employment of local rules to set limits on discovery,
and the use of magistrates in pretrial matters.
Protective Orders
Both Illinois and federal discovery rules grant courts authority
to deny, limit, modify, or regulate discovery in order to prevent
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. 51 In Illinois the trial court judge has wide discretion in the
control of discovery.52 Furthermore, Illinois appellate courts will
ney general and private attorney general and failing to confine the inquiry of the latter.
Kirkham, supra note 7, at 210.
Furthermore, the employment of abusive discovery and enjoyment of its self-serving benefits is by no means limited to private litigants. See E.E.O.C. v. Los Alamos Constructors,
Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1373 (D.N.M. 1974). See also Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360 (N.D. Ala.
1976).
50. E.g., Borg v. Borg, 32 Ill. 3d 1075, 1081, 337 N.E.2d 391, 396 (1975).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides in part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to
be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. ...
Compare with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(c):
The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or
witness, make a protective order as justice requires, denying, limiting, conditioning, or regulating discovery to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression.
Note that the Illinois rule allows the court greater discretion because it permits issuance
of a protective order without the requirement of a showing of good cause by the moving
party. Indeed, an Illinois court may issue such an order on its own initiative; a federal court
has no such authority.
52. People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967);
Northern Trust v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 43 Ill. App. 3d 169, 356 N.E.2d
1049 (1976); Bicek v. Quitter, 38 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 350 N.E.2d 125 (1976); Borg v. Borg, 32
Ill. App. 3d 1075, 337 N.E.2d 391 (1975); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., v. Eastern
Ill. Water Co., 31 Ill. App. 3d 148, 334 N.E.2d 96 (1975); Merrick v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 10 Ill.
App. 3d 104, 293 N.E.2d 767 (1973); Cohn v. Board of Educ. of
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not interfere with the trial court's discretion in the conduct of pretrial discovery procedures unless such discretion was clearly
abused.53 In administering its discretion over pretrial discovery,
the trial court must seek a balance between the need for truth and
54
the excessive burden on, or needless harassment of, the litigants.
By means of protective orders, the Illinois courts may require a
party making a broad request for production to show that the
materials requested are relevant.5 5 The courts may also control the
time, place, and scope of a discovery deposition, 56 limit the number
and scope of interrogatories,' 7 and require destructive testing of

Waukegan Twp. H.S. Dist. 119, 118 Ill. App. 2d 453, 254 N.E.2d 803 (1970); Stowers v. Carp,
29 Ill. App. 2d 52, 172 N.E.2d 370 (1961).
53. Bicek v. Quitter, 38 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 350 N.E.2d 125 (1976); Savitch v. Allman, 25
Ill. App. 3d 864, 323 N.E.2d 435 (1975); Cohn v. Board of Educ. of Waukegan Twp. H.S.
Dist. 119, 118 11. App. 2d 453, 254 N.E.2d 803 (1970). Even if a litigant is fortunate enough
to obtain appellate review of an adverse decision on a discovery matter, the chances of reversal of the trial court's ruling are slim. Thus, the responsibility for curbing excessive discovery ultimately rests with the trial court judge. See note 7 supra referring to the general
rule of non-appealability of discovery orders.
54. See People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bus, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967);
Cohn v. Board of Educ. of Waukegan Twp. H.S. Dist. 119, 118 Ill. App. 2d 453, 254 N.E.2d
803 (1970).
Limitations of the Illinois trial judge's discretion in the conduct of pretrial discovery are
imposed by the Illinois and federal constitutional guarantees of due process. In Bua the
Illinois Supreme Court held that "due process requires that production orders be sufficiently specific to inform a person of his obligation thereunder, especially in light of the
extreme sanctions available for a violation of such order." 37 Ill. 2d at 195, 226 N.E.2d at 15.
See also Slatten v. City of Chicago, 12 11. App. 3d 808, 299 N.E.2d 442 (1973), where the
court held that compelling a party to proceed to trial without the benefit of a discovery
deposition violated that party's right to a fair trial. But see Anastos v. O'Brien, 3 Ill. App.
3d 1015, 1021-22, 279 N.E.2d 759, 764 (1972) (rejecting contention that staying of deposition
by trial judge violated a "constitutional right to discovery"). But cf. People ex rel. General
Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967); Monier v. Chamberlain, 31 111. 2d
400, 202 N.E.2d N.E.2d 15 (1964); People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Il. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d
588 (1957) (in all three cases the court summarily stated that the requests to produce or
interrogatories involved did not violate state and federal constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures).
55. E.g., People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 III. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6
(1967); Borg v. Borg, 32 II. App. 3d 1075, 337 N.E.2d 391 (1975); Cohn v. Board of Educ. of
Waukegan Twp. H.S. Dist. 119, 118 Ill. App. 2d 453, 254 N.E.2d 803 (1970).
56. E.g., Saunders v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 307, 369 N.E.2d 518
(1977); Elliott v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 31 Ill. App. 3d 355, 335 N.E.2d 33
(1975); Carlson v. Healey, 69 Ill. App. 2d 236, 215 N.E.2d 831 (1966); Stowers v. Carp, 29 Ill.
App. 2d 52, 172 N.E.2d 370 (1961).
57. E.g., Northern Trust v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 43 Ill. App. 3d
169, 356 N.E.2d 1049 (1976); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Eastern Ill. Water
Co., 31 111. App. 3d 148, 334 N.E.2d 96 (1975); Merrick v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 10 11. App. 3d 104, 293 N.E.2d 767 (1973).
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evidence.' 8 Because the Illinois courts have such broad control over
discovery procedures, diligent Illinois trial judges are in a good position to curb excessive discovery. 9
As the federal rules do not confer such wide discretion, federal
protective orders are less effective in curtailing oppressive discovery tactics. A federal judge may only issue a protective order on
the motion of a party or a person from whom discovery is sought."0
Furthermore, Federal Rule 26(c) requires that the moving party
show good cause, thereby placing the burden on the movant to
show some adequate reason for the issuance of the protective
order.61
A movant may encounter difficulty in showing good cause, given
the federal court's tolerance of extensive discovery.62 One court has
stated that extensive discovery costs are a normal risk of doing
business." Hence, although a federal court can limit or condition
58. E.g., Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
59. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 51 supra; WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 370 (1976).
61. E.g., United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Glick v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1950). See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
62. For example, it is well settled in the federal courts that the fact that production of
documents would be burdensome and expensive and would hamper a party's business operations is not in itself a reason for granting a protective order, where discovery is otherwise
appropriate. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Rockaway Pix Theatre, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 36 F.R.D. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962); Jack
Loeks Enterprises, Inc. v. W.S. Butterfield Theatres, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 303 (E.D. Mich. 1957);
Service Liquor Distribs., Inc. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 16 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See
4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE V 34.19[21 (2d ed. 1979).
But see Krantz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Va. 1972); Schotthofer v. Hagstrom
Constr. Co., 23 F.R.D. 666 (S.D. Ill. 1958); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., Inc.,
4 F.R.D. 210 (W.D. Pa. 1946) (interrogatories should be few and limited to important facts,
rather than numerous and concerned with minor evidentiary details).
See also Niagara Duplicator Co., Inc. v. Shackleford, 160 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1947), where
the court held that where the principal offices of a corporate defendant were in San Francisco and the records requested were in Washington, D.C., and could not be separated or
moved without disrupting the defendant's business, a grant of a motion to produce was an
abuse of discretion.
63. In Service Liquor Distribs. Inc. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 16 F.R.D. 507, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), the court reasoned that "litigation is a normal risk of doing business, and
the production of documents is a normal risk of litigation. If an extensive production is
necessary to the fair conduct of litigation, then it, too, is a normal risk of doing business."
Query whether excessive production is inimical, rather than necessary, to the "fair conduct
of litigation."
The federal courts do not appear to have much sympathy for business litigants who are
burdened by excessive discovery. See, e.g., Keco Indus., Inc. v. Stearns Elec. Corp., 285 F.
Supp. 912 (E.D. Wis. 1968), where defendant's production request involved removing ap-
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discovery and can delineate the time and place for it,"' in actual
practice the courts infrequently exercise their power to curb excessive discovery.
Local Rules
Another method of dealing with excessive discovery is the promulgation of limits and standards for discovery through local rules.
The Illinois Supreme Court Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that courts may adopt, by their respective circuits or districts, rules consistent with the authorizing rules. 6
Interrogatories are a popular subject of local rules. Rule 3.1(a) of
the Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County limits the aggregate
number of interrogatories served on any party to thirty-five."0 In
the federal courts, local Rule 9(g) of the Northern District of Illinois limits the number to twenty. 67 Several federal districts prohibit the use of duplicated forms of "stock" interrogatories, unless
the nature of the case or the number of parties makes such forms
necessary and feasible.6"
Various other federal local rules require discovery conferences,
limit the scope of discovery at the early stages of an action, and
increase the emphasis on sanctions.69 Local Rule 4(a) of the Northern District of Illinois provides that a party taking a deposition at
a location more than 150 miles from the courthouse may be required by protective order to pay the expenses of attendance and
reasonable fee for one attorney for the adverse party. 0
The major drawback to local rules is that as the rulemaking ex-"
proximately 100,000 files from storage and carting them to a place of inspection. The court
commented that the plaintiff was not in a strong position to complain of burdensome requests because it sought damages of over $500,000.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 21 (1977); FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
66. Rule 3.1(a), RULES OF THE CImcurr COURT OF COOK COUNTY, states: "No party shall
serve on any other party more than 35 written interrogatories in the aggregate including
subsections without leave of court or agreement of the parties."
67. N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 9(g). A party wishing to serve more than 20 interrogatories must
submit a written motion to the court, setting forth the additional interrogatories and showing good cause for their use. Subparagraphs relating directly to the same subject matter
count as a single interrogatory.
68. E.g., E.D. ILL. R. 10(b); N.D. IND. R. 8(b).
69. Cohn, supra note 5, at 296.
70. N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 4(a). Such a rule may be invalid under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) because
it makes the protective order the norm and does not put the burden upon the adverse party
to establish a need for protection. Cohn, supra note 5, at 283. Compare with note 61 supra
and accompanying text.
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pands, principles of simplicity and uniformity are foresaken, resulting in a "procedural Tower of Babel. ' 71 An attorney who practices in more than one district or circuit may have trouble keeping
track of all the local rules-a situation not unlike the one which
plagued the federal practitioner prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 Another criticism of local rules is
that they are not always consistent with the authorizing rules (the
Illinois Supreme Court Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and may therefore be invalid."
Magistrates
An additional investment of time by trial judges is needed to
ensure that the discovery process works efficiently and does not
unnecessarily delay the flow of litigation. 7 ' Nevertheless, many
judges attempt to conserve judicial resources by reducing the time
spent supervising discovery procedures. 7 ' The use of federal magistrates 76 or Illinois associate judges"7 is one method of conserving
judicial time. However, there is evidence that the use of magistrates or similar court officers is not widely accepted.7 8 One explanation may be that judges think magistrates inappropriate or unqualified to manage discovery. 79 The benefits of using magistrates

71.

Cohn, supra note 5, at 295 (citing 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
§ 220 (1969)).
72. See generally Cohn, supra note 5, at 295.
73. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
74. Cohn, supra note 5, at 258. See generally CONNOLLY, supra note 6; Becker, supra
note 7; Pollack, supra note 7.
75. Cohn, supra note 5, at 258.
76. The Federal Magistrate Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631-39 (1976), was passed with an eye toward conserving the judges' time. The Act authorizes judges to designate a magistrate to
hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)
(1976).
77. Magistrates were eliminated by the 1970 Illinois Constitution, which replaced them
with associate judges. The associate judge, as authorized by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 295
(1979) may be assigned by the Chief Justice of the circuit to hear and determine any matter
other than a felony case.
78. Cohn, supra note 5, at 258.
79. One judge has commented, "to consign lawyers to a busy magistrate for management
purposes is like an artist leaving it to an apprentice to fill in the outlines and background of
a painting." Pollack, supra note 7, at 223.
Magistrates or special masters may not succeed at controlling discovery. See Xerox Corp.
v. International Business Mach. Corp., 75 F.R.D. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the parties
were embroiled in a dispute over the proper scope of discovery for over three years. The
district court removed the matter from the consideration of the Special Master because of
what it deemed to be "an unnecessary expense of time and resources." Id. at 671. The court
refused to allow the parties "to abuse and exploit the Special Master process." Id.
PROCEDURE
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or associate judges cannot be fairly assessed, therefore, because
they rarely supervise discovery in practice.
SUGGESTED METHODS OF DEALING WITH DISCOVERY ABUSE

Lawyers, judges, and scholars have offered suggestions on how to
treat the problem of excessive discovery.80 In addition, recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deal to a limited extent with the problems of excessive discovery and provide
guidelines for further proposals.81 These rules, suggestions, and
proposals generally fall into three categories: those affecting the
scope of discovery, those designed to increase judicial involvement
in the discovery process, and those concerned with sanctions.
Limiting the Scope of Discovery
Modern pretrial discovery in both Illinois and federal courts enjoys a tremendous breadth of scope in matters and materials subject to discovery."' Some observers argue that a liberal scope of
discovery is a major cause of excessiveness.8 " Thus, limiting the
scope of discovery is one proposed solution to abuse. 4 The scope of
discovery could be limited to any unprivileged matter relevant to
the issues raised by the pleadings,85 or to the claims or defenses of
any party.88 However, there is strong sentiment that discovery
abuse, while serious in certain cases, is not widespread enough to
80. See Becker, supra note 7; Lundquist, supra note 3; Pollack, supra note 7.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 5, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 37, and 45 (eff. August 1, 1980), reprintedin
48 U.S.L.W. 4497 (May 6, 1980). These new rules are the final result of proposals made by
the Advisory Committee in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

(Feb. 1979), reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as PROPOSED AMENDMENTS]. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart and
Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the adoption of the amendments, because they thought
the amendments were not enough to effectively curb abuse. 48 U.S.L.W. 4497, 4499 (May 6,
1980).
82. See notes 32 through 40 supra and accompanying text.
83. "The phrase 'liberal discovery' has become a banner for forces leading to injustice."
Lundquist, supra note 3, at 60. See generally Editorial, supra note 23; Kirkham, supra note
7.
84. See A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE
STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 A.B.A. REPORT]; SPECIAL COMTO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

MITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, COMMENTS ON REVISED PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 SPECIAL
Lundquist, supra note 3.
1977 A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 84; Lundquist, supra note 3.
1979 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 84.

TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
MITTEE];

85.
86.

COM-
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require the drastic remedy of altering the scope of discovery.87
Limiting the scope of discovery may also be an undesirable alternative because such limitations may be inconsistent with the concept of notice pleading and could lead to rigidities and technicalities in pleading. 8 In view of the wide popularity of the present
scope of discovery, it is unlikely that a restriction of its scope
would be accepted.
Greater Judicial Involvement
A much more popular approach to curb excessive discovery is to
increase the trial court judge's supervision over discovery procedures. 89 A study has shown that greater involvement in discovery
by the court reduces the likelihood that abuses will occur, and
maximizes the chance that when they do occur, they will be dealt
with firmly.9 0
Judicial involvement has curtailed excessiveness in some cases.
Judges have denied discovery when the purpose of a discovery request is to obtain information for use in proceedings other than
the present action." Courts have also disallowed discovery when a
87.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (eff. August 1, 1980), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 4497 (May 6, 1980);
supra note 81, at 332 (Advisory Committee Note to subsequently

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS,

enacted Rule 26(f)). See generally CONNOLLY, supra note 6; ELLINGTON, supra note 3. The

Advisory Committee Note to the new FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) answers the call for a narrower
scope of discovery: "The Committee believes that abuse of discovery, while very serious in
certain cases, is not so general as to require such basic changes in the rules that govern
discovery in all cases."
88. [T]echnical litigators will have a field day with construction and evasion. We
might well be right back to the pleading complexities which were junked in 1938
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to dig out cases from byzantine
technicalities that obstructed or prevented litigants from reaching the merits and
a just result.
Pollack, supra note 7, at 220. See note 33 supra.
89. "[T]rial judges-despite the heavy burden most of them carry-are now increasingly
recognizing the 'pressing need for judicial supervision [of discovery].'" Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 180 (1979) (concurring opinion of Powell, J.). In Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp. v. Civic Center Theatre, Inc., 33 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1964), the court stated that it is
the trial judge's duty to supervise and control discovery; failure to exercise this control
would result in the perversion of the rules of discovery and bring about serious injustices.
Id. at 362. See also Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (eff. August 1, 1980)
(providing for participation in a discovery plan): "In the judgment of the Committee abuse
can best be prevented by intervention by the Court as soon as the abuse is threatened."
90. ELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 12. However, there is criticism that judges fail to exercise such supervision and "are overly tolerant of lawyers who exploit the inherently contentious aspects of the adversary system to their own private advantage at public expense."
Burger, supra note 7, at 91.
91. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 353 n.17 (1978); Mississippi
Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 565-68 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Econo-Car Int'l,
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party's purpose is to delay bringing a case to trial, or to embarrass
or harass the respondent.92 The federal courts have barred discovery of a party where the sole purpose of such discovery is to prepare the adversary's case.9 3 Further, some courts have denied discovery where the requesting party can get the information itself, or
9 4
already possesses such information due to prior investigation.
However, the policy of full disclosure apparently justifies the lack
of judicial intervention in discovery matters. Hence, instances
where the courts have restricted discovery are rare.95
Nevertheless, certain situations require judicial supervision over
discovery. In large complex cases the trial judge is in the best position to organize discovery to reduce costs and complexity. The
Manual for Complex Litigation was developed to help achieve
these goals of simplification and cost reduction. 6 The Manual sug-

Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.V.I. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499
F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Crabtree v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 43 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), which held in a class action suit that discovery rules are to enable parties to prepare
for trial with their own bona fide claims, not to determine whether third parties may have
similar claims.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 360 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1966); Balistrieri v. Holtzman, 52 F.R.D. 23 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 353 n.17 (1978), wherein the Court states, "In deciding whether a request comes within
the discovery rules, a court is not required to blind itself to the purpose for which a party
seeks information." But cf. Adelman v. Nordberg Mfg. Co., 6 F.R.D. 383 (E.D. Wis. 1947),
where the court allowed burdensome and oppressive interrogatories on the theory that the
objecting party would have to collect the same information to put on its own case; the interrogatories merely advanced the gathering to an earlier time.
93. See Krantz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Va. 1972); Kainz v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 15 F.R.D. 242 (N.D. I1. 1954). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516
(1947) (concurring opinion) where Justice Jackson remarked that, "common law trial is and
always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a
learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the
adversary.
94. See, e.g., Krantz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Va. 1972); Loft, Inc. v. Corn
Products Ref. Co., 103 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 558 (1939). But see WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS 356 (1976) ("It is no objection that the examining party already knows the
facts as to which he seeks discovery, since one of the purposes of discovery is to ascertain
the position of the adverse party on controverted issues."); Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco
Distrib. Inc., 25 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (discovery permitted); Bowles v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 4 F.R.D. 469 (W.D. Mo. 1945) (same).
95. But see cases cited in notes 11 through 21 supra and accompanying text.
96. MANUAL, supra note 47. The MANUAL emphasizes that its procedures can only be
effective if "the judge fairly, speedily, and firmly employs" them. Id. at § 0.60.
"Complex litigation" is defined as "one or two or more related cases which present unusual problems and which require extraordinary treatment, including but not limited to the
cases designated as 'protracted' and 'big.'" Id. at § 0.10. While the "big" or "protracted"
cases seem to generate more than their share of excessive discovery, abuse can be found in
nearly every type of civil case. Discovery problems frequently occur in conventional civil
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gests a series of pretrial conferences to narrow the issues for discovery and to establish a schedule for completing discovery.9 7 This
method is popular among those who advocate judicial control of
the discovery process.9 8
The amendments to the Federal Rules also provide for a discovery conference. Under new Rule 26(f), parties and their attorneys
are under a duty to participate in the framing of a discovery plan
proposed by any other attorney in the action.9 The rule permits a
judge, following a discovery conference, to identify the issues for
discovery, to establish a plan and schedule for discovery, and to
determine "such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the proper management of discovery in
the action." 10 0 Rule 26(f) therefore serves to restrain excessive discovery demands at their inception.
New Rule 26(f) also requires that an attorney requesting a discovery conference stipulate that he or she has made a reasonable
effort to reach agreement with the opposing attorneys. Similar provisions are presently found in federal local Rule 12(d) of the
Northern District of Illinois"' and in Illinois Supreme Court Rule
201(k). o2

cases involving written interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Becker,
supra note 7, at 277. Indeed, the research for this article has revealed that a wide range of
civil cases suffer at one time or another from abusive discovery.
97. MANUAL, supra note 47, at §§ 0.40, 1.80, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.40.
98. E.g., CONNOLLY, supra note 6, at 77-84 (outlining model for effective discovery control); Pollack, supra note 7, at 224-25 (establishing workable procedures for case management). Supervision by the trial judge may be ineffective to limit or reduce discovery because
the court merely directs the parties on their way through excessive discovery. Kirkham,
supra note 7, at 211.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (eff. August 1, 1980), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 4497 (May 6,
1980). See also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 81, at 330-31. Rule 26(f) calls for a discovery conference upon the initiative of the court or upon request by an attorney for any
party, provided that the party's request includes certain information. Cf. 1979 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 84, at 19-20, where the A.B.A. Committee stated that the duty to participate should be a duty to cooperate, but otherwise agreed with the proposed rule. "A lawyer
is not likely to be recalcitrant when he knows that his adversary has a right to demand a
discovery conference before a judge empowered to award substantial sanctions." Id. at 21.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (eff. August 1, 1980), reprinted in 44 U.S.L.W. 4497 (May 6,
1980).
101. N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 12(d). Rule 12(d) provides that the court "shall hereinafter refuse
to hear any and all motions for discovery [or for] production . . .unless moving counsel
shall first advise the Court in writing that after personal consultation and sincere attempts
to resolve [their] differences," the attorneys failed to reach an accord. The rule also requires
that the written statement by the movant set forth the details of the conference or consultation between the attorneys.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(k) (1979). See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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These rules place the initial burden upon the parties to reach
agreement concerning discovery matters, and thereby attempt to
reduce the amount of time the judge must spend resolving discovery disputes.0 3 They are, in effect, efforts to balance the conflicting
demands on the trial judge's time. The rationale behind this measure is that the attorneys for the parties are in a better position
than the judge to identify the matters for discovery and to resolve
such problems as timing, method, and location of discovery."0 " It is
therefore appropriate that the parties initially control discovery
with an option to later seek a discovery conference if they cannot
reach agreement. Rule 26(f) thereby draws an effective balance between the need for greater judicial involvement and the lack of judicial time.
Sanctions for Excessive Discovery
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(d) provides for sanctions for
abuse of discovery. 10 5 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently contain no rule relating specifically to sanctions for excessive discovery. Nor do the recent amendments make any provision

Under the broad grant of power in Illiihois Supreme Court Rule 201(c)(2), a trial judge can
order a discovery conference. "Upon the motion of any party or witness, on notice to all
parties, or on its own initiative without notice, the court may supervise all or any part of
any discovery procedure." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 201(c)(2) (1979).
103. See generally Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View from the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245
(1977).
104. See 1979 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 84, at 19.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l1A, § 219(d), provides for the suppression of information obtained from the abuse of discovery procedures and further authorizes sanctions against a
party who "willfully obtains or attempts to obtain information by an improper discovery
method, willfully obtains or attempts to obtain information to which he is not entitled, or
otherwise abuse these discovery rules." There are no reported decisions on this relatively
new rule; however, the standards used to apply sanctions for noncompliance with discovery
are well established. The purpose of discovery sanctions in Illinois is to accomplish the objects of discovery and not merely to penalize a party who had been less than diligent in
complying with discovery procedures. Savitch v. Allman, 25 Ill. App. 3d 864, 323 N.E.2d 435
(1975). Cf. Serpe v. Yellow Cab Co., 10 I1. App. 3d 1, 293 N.E.2d 742 (1973) (trial court
cannot impose sanctions intended primarily to punish). The standard is one of reasonableness-whether there was a deliberate and pronounced disregard for the rule, or deliberately
contumacious or unwarranted disregard of the court's authority. 612 N. Michigan Av. Bldg.
Corp. v. Factsystem, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 922, 340 N.E.2d 678 (1975). On the decision
whether to impose a sanction, as in all other discovery matters before the trial court, the
judge is afforded a wide amount of discretion. Buckler v. Sinclair, 68 Ill. App. 2d 283, 216
N.E.2d 14 (1966). In Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill.2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1978), however,
the court suggested a less flexible policy on discovery sanctions when it stated, "Discovery
for all parties will not be effective unless trial courts do not countenance violations, and
unhesitatingly impose sanctions proportionate to the circumstances."
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for imposing sanctions for abuse of discovery, other than imposing
costs on a party or attorney who "fails to participate in good faith
in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement," as is required by
proposed Rule 26(f). 10 6
Although sanctions may serve the important function of expressing the final word of the court regarding a party's intent to abuse
discovery procedures, the effectiveness of sanctions in deterring or
preventing discovery abuse is questionable. Critics state that discovery sanctions are hollow threats, 7 ineffective to prevent discovery abuse because they provide for retrospective punishment of
offenders. 0 8 A study has found considerable factual support for
the widely held belief that judges are reluctant to impose sanctions
to punish many discovery abuses, even where the parties have violated prior court orders. 0 9 The courts may decide not to apply
sanctions when the party seeking sanctions has also abused the
discovery procedures. Judges may think that the parties themselves should solve their problems, or may feel the need to be moderate to keep the respect of the bar. In addition, judges may think
sanctions are counterproductive because they inflame the litigants,
making settlements more difficult. 10
Another federal study has indicated that sanctions inadequately
deter discovery abuses,"' especially since the United States Supreme Court has generally required willfulness or bad faith by the

106. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g) (eff. August 1, 1980), reprinted in 44 U.S.L.W. 4497, 4499
(May 6, 1980). See also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 81, at 346 (Proposed Rule
37(e)). The A.B.A. Committee recommended that additional sanctions be imposed for abuse
of discovery, citing their deterrent effect. 1977 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 84, at 21.
107. E.g., ELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 2 ("[Clertainly sanctions are more apparent than
real.").
108. Judge Pollack argues that sanctions should be auxiliary, not primary, relief, because
"strengthening sanctions is . . . approach[ing] the virus with the wrong antidote." Pollack,
supra note 7, at 226.
109. ELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 3-4. Furthermore, opposition to the motion for sanctions significantly reduces the likelihood that the court will impose them. Id. at 5. Professor
Ellington summarizes the effect of this process on the litigants:
At best, the practice of sanctioning only after a prior order is a cumbersome business. It requires a litigant to make two trips to the courthouse to enforce a discovery request: once to secure an order to compel discovery and then again to seek
sanctions to enforce that earlier order. At its worst, the effort will prove futile.
The request for sanctions will be denied and the recalcitrant party given still more
time to render the promised compliance.
Id. at 4-5.
110. Id. at 10; Sanctions, supra note 9.
111.

CONNOLLY, supra note 6, at 18.
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abusing party before applying sanctions.'1 2 The studies of sanctions mentioned above give rise to the conclusion that sanctions
are ineffective to prevent abuse of discovery. Other methods of
dealing with the problem of excessive discovery deserve greater
attention.
Other Proposals
Various methods have been suggested to help solve the problem
of excessive discovery. One proposal is that the motion for summary judgment be used more frequently to trim the issues and
thereby trim the discovery."' Others suggest more radical changes,
such as calling for compelled disclosure or "mandatory discovery,""' which requires a party to disclose in the pleadings certain
facts relevant to the action.
Certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempt to reduce the costs of discovery by providing for the recording of depositions by other than stenographic means upon stipulation of the parties" 5 and the taking of depositions by telephone." S
Other suggested methods include not filing discovery papers until
they are actually used in a proceeding, so that needless copying
costs are eliminated,' 1 and allowing the person administering the
oath at a deposition to leave after the oath, rather than sitting idly
through the deposition."' These economical measures do not in
themselves add up to a great cost savings. However, their combined effect will help to mitigate the financial burden of excessive
U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980); National
112. Id. See Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 180, n.4 (1979) (concurring opinion of
Powell, J.): "In some instances, it might be appropriate for the district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other developments in discovery might reduce the need for the material demanded." See also Kennelly, supra note 19, at 461; Rogers, Summary Judgments in
Antitrust Conspiracy Litigation, 10 Loy. CHI. L.J. 667, 689 (1979).
114. See Janofsky, A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A.J.
1323, 1324 (1979); Blair, supra note 3, at 323.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) (eff. August 1, 1980), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 4497, 449798 (May 6, 1980). See also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 81, at 334. "The amendment
is made to encourage parties to agree to the use of electronic recording of depositions so that
conflicting claims with respect to the potential of electronic recording for reducing costs of
depositions can be appraised in light of greater experience." Id. at 337 (Advisory Committee
Comments).
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7) (eff. August 1, 1980), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 4497, 4498
(May 6, 1980).
117. 1979 SPECIAL COMMTEE, supra note 84, at 34.
118. Id. at 37.
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discovery.
Although legislative advisers have suggested various methods of
curbing abuse, no proposals have been made concerning the attorney's responsibility to conduct reasonable discovery. Perhaps recommending that the A.B.A. and other bar associations institute
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who abuse the discovery
process is too extreme. A more feasible alternative would be to require attorneys to sign all discovery requests or motions to certify
that they have read the request or motion, that to the best of their
knowledge, information, and belief there exists good grounds to
support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. 119 Although it
may be. difficult to prove violations of such a requirement,1 2 ° the
signing lawyer would at least be reminded of the ethical considerations of his discovery motives.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The causes of excessive discovery may largely be attributed to
the policy of a broad scope of discovery and the lack of judicial
supervision. 2 ' However, there can be no greater cause than the attitudes of the lawyers who participate in such abuse. Whether excessive discovery is a part of an overall litigation strategy to coerce
the opponent into acquiescence, or a manifestation of a philosophy
of "the more, the better," it is the attorney who must recognize
that such practices do not speak well of the profession. For any set
of rules to work, attorneys must be willing to make them work.' 22
The attorney's duty to the profession and responsibility for the administration of justice must balance the attorney's devotion to his
or her client.'2 3 Although there are no specific provisions pertain119. Such a rule would be patterned after Rule 11, FED. R. Civ. P., which requires certification of pleadings and provides for disciplinary action for willful violations.
120. The disciplinary provisions of Rule 11, FED. R. Civ. P., have not seen such
duty-since 1938 there have been few reported violations.
121. See notes 32 through 45 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Cohn, supra note 5, at 297; Lundquist, supra note 3, at 61.
123. The classic statement of an advocate's duty to his client would permit excessive
discovery as a means to an end:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and
at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his
first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences,
though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
Cohn, supra note 5, at 297 n.280, quoting Queen Caroline's Case, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).
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ing to discovery abuse in the American Bar Association's Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Code does provide, "A lawyer
should promote public confidence in our system and our legal profession."1 24 The use of excessive discovery, for whatever reason,
certainly does not inspire confidence in the legal profession.12 5
CONCLUSION

There is significant evidence that modern discovery procedures
are being abused through misuse and overuse by litigants in both
federal and Illinois courts. "The average litigant is overdiscovered,
overinterrogated, and overdeposed."' 2 6 Excessive discovery clouds
rational judicial decision-making and makes many facets of litigation inaccessible to those lacking the necessary funds. Unfortunately, many attorneys accept excessive discovery as the developing norm.
Of all the methods, existing and proposed, of dealing with discovery abuse, greater judicial control over discovery procedures appears to be the most popular, and the most promising, method.
This control may result from increased judicial initiative, or
through changes in the procedural rules. Through such increased
involvement, the judge can work to limit the breadth of inquiry.
Because judicial time is precious, magistrates and associate judges
should be more widely used. The State of Illinois has already
worked many of the suggested methods to curb abuse into its Supreme Court Rules. For this reason, and because of the wide scope
of discretion allowed the Illinois circuit judge in matters of discovery, it is recommended that Illinois discovery procedures be studied in further detail to serve as a possible model for federal
discovery.
Abusive discovery practices cannot be stopped without the aid of
the lawyers practicing in the courts. To this end, the bar and the
courts must strive to educate the attorney about the ethical considerations involved in the abuse of discovery, and must work to
make the motivations for excessive discovery unrewarding.
DOMINICK W.

SAVAIANO

This view is untenable in the context of modern litigation.
124. A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs No. 9.
125. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 23.
126. Pollack, supra note 7, at 222 (quoting Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit).

